WALHI-INDONESIAN
WALHI-INDONESIAN FORUM FOR ENVIRONMENT
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Lapindo and Government Soundness
The impact of the Lapindo mudflow continues to expand
(2006).
The impact of the Lapindo mudflow continues to expand
(2006).
The issue of Presidential Regulation No. 14/2007 on the
Formation of the Sidoarjo Mud Task Force simultaneously
marked the end of work by the Lapindo Mud National Task
Team, which operated from 29 May 2006 until 8 September
under Presidential Decree No. 13/2006.
According to Presidential Decree No. 13/2006, the Lapindo
Mud National Task Team was given the job of stopping
uncontrolled mud flows, handling management of the mud’s
surface effects and managing socio-economic problems caused
by the Lapindo hot mud. Various attempts at stopping the
Lapindo hot mudflow were made. Unfortunately none succeeded
in stopping the mudflow. Apart from technical obstacles,
non-technical limitations were very evident, even dominant.
It is no exaggeration that, without any funds whatsoever
from PT Lapindo Brantas, it was not possible for control
efforts to succeed.
After a year of the Lapindo hot mud, PT Lapindo Brantas has
failed to discharge its responsibilities, from stopping the
hot mudflow to paying compensation to victims. Furthermore,
PT Lapindo Brantas has failed to bear the losses suffered by
industries in Sidoarjo and East Java. Overall, since the
mudflow overran the Porong toll node, the costs of economic
production and distribution have escalated.
WALHI observes that PT Lapindo Brantas is yet to take full
responsibility for its negligence in the drilling at Banjar
Panji Well 1, Porong, Sidoarjo, to the extent that the
suffering of victims in the community has continued without
any semblance of comprehensive management. Rather, the
government has implemented a policy favouring capital power
instead of the Porong people. Ironically, it is President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who has caved in to this
vacillating attitude.
After one year of the Lapindo hot mud flow, the fate of the
victims has not improved one bit. In the interim they have
lived adrift in refugee camps, their futures suddenly
sidelined. It is not surprising, in the midst of such
suffering and despair, that a proportion of the Lapindo
victims have developed psychological disorders.
In these alarming conditions, the failure of the government
to afford protection to the community becomes obvious.
Though claiming to provide protection, the government is
instead seen to make policy that harms the people. This is
evident in Presidential Regulation No. 14/2007 on Formation
of the Sidoarjo Mud Task Force. In this policy, payment of
compensation will be by installments and without interest.
On top of that, many victims have experienced difficulty in
obtaining compensation for their inundated land. Lapindo,
for its part, has impeded the process for victims to fulfill
prerequisites for compensation. As a result, payment of
compensation has proceeded extremely slowly. The government
seems to have turned a blind eye, and has not adequately
fast-tracked the process to help people overcome the
difficulties they face.
Based on these facts, WALHI is not exaggerating in claiming
that: first, the government has not been serious in
defending the people and has seemed to allow the people to
drown in suffering; two, the national budget has been
damaged by corporate crime (PT Lapindo Brantas), which has
resulted in the loss of welfare for the Porong people; and
three, the government itself lacks seriousness in upholding
the law in Porong.
WALHI sues Lapindo
As the handling of the Lapindo hot mud disaster dragged on,
WALHI was compelled to sue Lapindo Brantas Incorporated, PT
Energi Mega Persada, Tbk, Kalila Energy Limited, Pan Asia
Enterprise, PT Medco Energi Tbk, Santos Australia Ltd, the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia cq the President of
the Republic of Indonesia, the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia cq the Republic of Indonesia Minister for Mineral
Resource Energy, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
cq the Executive Agency for Oil and Natural Gas Upstream
Enterprise Activity, the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia cq the Republic of Indonesia Minister for the
Environment, the Provincial Government of East Java,
Republic of Indonesia cq the Governor of East Java Province,
Sidoarjo Regency Regional Government, East Java Province,
and the Republic of Indonesia cq the Sidoarjo Regent.
PT Lapindo Brantas was sued using the principle of absolute
accountability as encapsulated in article 35 passage 1 of
the Law on the Environment No. 23/1997. This principle
requires the accountability of environmental
polluters/damagers, wherein the accuser is not required to
prove the element of guilt.
In this suit, WALHI urges the government to immediately
order PT Lapindo Brantas and its chief companies to
immediately allocate a budget and resources to overcome the
mudflow, tackle the environmental damage that has occurred,
and restore environmental function that has been damaged so
that it can function as it did prior to the mudflow,
covering all areas affected by the Lapindo hot mudflow.
It is evident that various attempts to control the Lapindo
mudflow have been brought to a standstill due to the
blockage of funding from PT Lapindo Brantas. The State Audit
Board estimates losses from the Lapindo hot mud from 2006 to
2015 will reach Rp 32,895 trillion. Meanwhile the
compensation that has been paid and that remains a
commitment of PT Lapindo Brantas is around 4,904 trillion.
Will PT Lapindo Brantas delay the discharge of its
responsibilities until 2015?
The Flow of Lapindo Funds
A solution to the negative impacts of the Lapindo hot
mudflow fully depends on the seriousness of PT Lapindo
Brantas on one hand, and the SBY-JK Government on the other.
Unfortunately, after one year, clarification on who will be
responsible for preventing the impacts and spread of
environmental damage remains unclear. In fact, PT Lapindo
Brantas and its chief companies have sufficient funds to
underwrite the Lapindo hot mudflow problem. At this point,
the seriousness of Lapindo Brantas becomes the key to their
response to the hot mudflow, which was caused by their
negligence.
In the paper entitled The Financing of the Three Brantas PSC
Companies, it is disclosed that the shareholdings of Brantas
Block in East Java, in order, are Energi Mega Persada,
Indonesia (50%), Medco Energi, Indonesia (32%), and Santos,
Australia (18%). Further to this, it is reported that the
nominal value of the three share holders in Brantas Block
are, in no small quantity, distributed across financial
institutions in several countries, such as Indonesia,
Australia, England, United States, France, Singapore, the
Netherlands, Germany, Malaysia, Switzerland and Hong Kong.
Furthermore, the paper publishes the profiles of the three
aforementioned companies and the size of their holdings. PT
Energi Mega Persada Tbk is an oil and gas company
established in 2001. In 2003 and 2004, EMP obtained rights
to explore oil and gas in three areas, namely the Malacca
Strait (Riau, 60.49%), Brantas (East Java, 50%) and Kangean
(East Java, 100%). Subsequently in 2005, EMP publicly
announced that it had achieved an annual turnover worth Rp
1,479 billion (US$ 152 million) in 2005 and obtained a net
profit of Rp 196 billion (US$ 20 million). Similar scenarios
apply for Medco Energi (turnover worth US$ 620.2 million in
2005 and US$ 74.7 million profit) and Santos (turnover worth
A$ 2,769 million in 2006 and A$ 643 million profit).
In view of the distribution of funds owned by PT Energi Mega
Persada Tbk, Medco Energi and Santos as the chief companies
of PT Lapindo Brantas, the claim that funds are unavailable
is refuted. With billions of dollars, the Lapindo hot
mudflow could surely be stopped and the Porong people’s
rights addressed more quickly, without waiting for a year to
pass. If all is permitted to continue ‘business as usual’,
the question must be raised, “how sound is our government?”
Waiting for government soundness
The passing of one year since the start of the Lapindo hot
mudflow should at least spur the SBY-JK Government to be
more serious in representing the Porong people. President
SBY must open his eyes to the 20,000 victims of the Lapindo
hot mud, the 5,000 people who have lost their jobs, and the
30% decline in economic production in East Java, which could
potentially affect the national economy. If the victims of
the Lapindo hot mud are not treated humanely, is it
appropriate to describe public servants as humans?
At the beginning of May 2007, volume 2 reshuffle was
announced to the public. However, there was no concrete
change in the hopes of the Lapindo hot mud victims in
Porong, Sidoarjo. Instead, community welfare was symbolized
through a government public suffering coordinator. This
situation has continued until now. Truly unsound.
If government soundness never bares its teeth, the Lapindo
hot mudflow can be described as: ‘a mousedeer and crocodile
show’.
For more information, please contact:
Ivan Valentine A
Law and Litigations (National Office)
Email Ivan Valentine A
Telepon kantor: +62-(0)21-791 93 363
Mobile:
Fax: +62-(0)21-794 1673
http://www.eng.walhi.or.id/kampanye/cemar/industri/070525_lapindo_govt_cu/?&printer_friendly=true
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